In economics, privacy is usually discussed in the context of consumer preferences and price discrimination. But what forms of personal data privacy are compatible with merchants' interests in knowing more about their consumers, and how can identity management systems protect information privacy while enabling personalization and price discrimination? I n the economics literature, privacy is usually dis cussed in the context of consumer preferences and reservation prices: merchants are interested in finding out a consumer's preferences because from those they can infer the consumer's maximum willingness to pay for a good (his reservation price). The ability to identify consumers and track their pur chase histories, therefore, lets merchants charge prices that extract as much surplus as possible from the sale, which is what economists call price discrimination. [1] [2] [3] In this context, consumer privacy concerns reduce to individuals' issues with their personal preferences be ing known to merchants and exploited for profit.
However, economists also acknowledge that con sumer privacy is not just about hiding the price paid for a good. 4, 5 During any economic transaction, a con sumer might rationally wish to share with a merchant certain types of personal data while keeping others private. 6 Consumers can incur several costs (and, also, gain several benefits) when revealing personal data during a purchase: costs associated with spam, profiling, or financial fraud when addresses, names, or financial data are revealed, and benefits associated with targeted offers or personalized recommendations when information about tastes and interests is shared. The personal data shared during a transaction does not need to be personally identifiable for those cost or benefits to occur. For instance, a merchant can infer a consumer's preferences without knowing the con sumer's name or other public identifiers (such as his or her creditcard number); or, a consumer's status (as a student, senior citizen, or member of the military) can be shared with a merchant without also disclosing his or her purchas ing history.
Identity management systems can support such selective information revelation strategies by giv ing consumers greater control over which identities are established, which attributes are associated with them, and under what circumstances they're revealed to others. Therefore, such systems allow for transac tions in which some level of information sharing is accompanied by some level of information hiding. At the same time, economic views of privacy that are more granular than the one formal micro models ordinarily focus on-that is, privacy as the protec tion of a consumer's set of preferences-show that there are both costs and benefits when information other than a consumer's preferences and reservation prices are protected or revealed. The issue becomes what dimensions of personal data privacy are com patible with merchants' interests in knowing more about their consumers and their valuations for goods or services. In this article, I'll examine several ways in which identity management systems can protect certain types of information privacy while simulta neously supporting various forms of personalization and price discrimination.
Identity management and privacy
Identity management systems make it possible for individuals and organizations to engage in selective information revelation strategies.
7-9 By offering con sumers some control over how their identities and associated attributes are established and revealed to others, they become tools for privacy protection and for an efficient economic balancing of information hiding and sharing.
Different types of personal information raise dif ferent privacy concerns. Merchants can use certain data (such as a consumer's preferences) for price dis crimination. Other data (such as the consumer's creditcard number or personal address) can lead to financial fraud or spam. Accordingly, different types of privacyenhancing identity management strategies protect different types of information. In the context I'm considering here, it's worthwhile to differenti ate between privacyenhancing strategies that aim to provide anonymity and those that aim to provide pseudonymity.
Pseudonymizing technologies can link various trans actions (payments, emails, HTTP requests) by the same agent to the same pseudonym identity, although they aren't traceable to permanent public identifiers (such as a name). Anonymizing technologies not only make any transaction from a certain agent untrace able to that agent's permanent, public identity, but also ensure that adversaries can't link together vari ous transactions by the same agent. In the realm of privacyenhancing electronic payments, for instance, David Chaum's eCash 10 is an example of an anony mizing technology, whereas Steven Low, Nicholas Maxemchuk, and Sanjoy Paul's creditcard approach 11 is better defined as a pseudonymizing technology.
A pseudonymizing technology can protect a purchaser's financial identity during a transaction. But an anonymizing technology, in addition to that, might also protect purchasers from having their pur chase history tracked or might offer the additional psychological comfort of complete anonymity. This technological distinction is important from an eco nomic perspective because different combinations of transaction linkability and traceability allow different types of information to be shared and different types of price discrimination to be implemented.
Price discrimination, identity, and tracking
As noted earlier, price discrimination refers to a sell er's ability to provide the same commodity or service at different prices to different consumers. This price is based on the seller's estimation of the price a buyer might be willing to pay for that good.
Price discrimination is very common in all types of markets: at the cinema, in airline booking systems, and, in fact, online, where increasingly sophisticated tracking technologies let merchants adjust prices based on the visitor's location (as revealed by his or her IP address), time spent on the site, cookie information, history of previous purchases, and so on.
Economists distinguish between three types of price discrimination, which they call "degrees" for technical reasons beyond this article's scope. In first degree price discrimination, prices are based on in dividual preferences (in the extreme case, individual buyers could receive a customized price matching their maximum willingness to pay, or reservation price, for the good). In seconddegree price discrimination, customers selfselect into buying different versions or quantities of the good; in other words, the seller offers a menu of options for a product (for instance, standard and premium version), and consumers freely choose the option they desire (and the associated price). In thirddegree price discrimination, differential prices are assigned to different consumer segments based on some observable group characteristics, such as age, student status, or geographical location.
Each degree of price discrimination relies on dif ferent types of personal information being available to the merchant, and therefore raises different privacy issues. It's generally believed that consumers don't accept price discrimination (the notorious "random ized" price experiment that Amazon.com attempted a few years ago provoked angry consumer reaction 12 ). However, customers don't mind price discrimination when it implies lower prices than those charged to other customers-that is, when they benefit from it. Economists usually regard price discrimination favor ably because it can be "welfare enhancing:" 1, 3, 13, 14 under certain conditions, by increasing aggregate eco nomic welfare-for instance, when a good wouldn't even be produced unless its producer could target a segment of consumers willing to pay high prices for it. Price discrimination can also increase the welfare of consumers with lower evaluations for a certain good, who otherwise might not have been offered the good at prices matching their willingness to pay.
Given that price discrimination often relies on consumer identification, it might seem incompatible with privacy protection. This, in turn, would imply that adopting privacyenhancing technologies would come at the cost of the welfare enhancements that price discriminative strategies otherwise provide.
1 Andrew Odlyzko 14 observed that the current privacy debate in ecommerce is fueled by the clash between consumers and merchants around the use of personal information for price discrimination, and that the movement to re duce privacy online might be motivated by the incen tives to price discriminate. Consumers want privacy, which implies freedom from being tracked, yet mer chants want to track consumers, which implies their ability to charge prices that improve their profits (for a more recent view on this theme by the same author, see Odlyzko's other work 15, 16 Whether privacyenhancing identity management systems are compatible with pricediscriminative strategies depend on what type of information they're designed to shield, and therefore on the scope of their privacy protection.
Price discrimination with identity management
Different degrees of price discrimination are com patible with different privacypreserving identity management strategies. Let's look at some specific ex amples of psuedonymity or anonymity in electronic purchases. I should note that using an anonymous payment technology isn't sufficient for protecting an online buyer's identity when other personal informa tion could be revealed during the transaction: a ship ping address, the name of the sender in a gift card, an IP address, or unique tastes, selections, or purchasing patterns can lead to the buyer's reidentification, even when he or she uses anonymizing technologies. In what follows, I'll assume a scenario in which the suite of technologies buyers use (from privacypreserving payment technologies to anonymous email and anon ymous browsing) hides all data that could otherwise reveal his or her public identity.
First degree
As noted earlier, firstdegree price discrimination consists of differential prices being offered to individ ual consumers based on their willingness to pay for a good. Although this observation might suggest that in order to implement firstdegree price discrimination, a seller must know the consumer's identity, this isn't necessarily the case. Firstdegree price discrimination relies more on the seller's ability to estimate individual reservation prices than on its ability to recognize actual individual identities. Such reservation prices depend on consum ers' preferences and tastes, and are predictable-for example, by observing consumers' behavior or pur chase histories. Therefore, a merchant might estimate them even in the presence of pseudonymizing tech nologies or, under uncertain conditions, anonymizing technologies as well.
First, the merchant can link consumer purchase histories or customer profiles that include a custom er's preferences or tastes to individual pseudonymous identities, and even trace them to persistent identifiers (such as an email address used repeatedly to login to an account with a merchant or a loyalty card used for multiple purchases from a grocerystore chain). Such identifiers can be pseudonymous: in other words, they can separate information about the online persona (the purchase history in a certain account) from the owner of that account's public identity (name, credit card number, and so on). Such separation can be en forced through pseudonymous payment technologies that link individual transactions by the same subject to each other through persistent pseudonymous identi ties, but that aren't traceable back to the purchaser's offline identity. An example of such technologies is Low and colleagues' creditcard protocol, 11 which a consumer would use in coordination with other anonymous browsing and messaging technologies. The linkages between transactions help merchants recognize a consumer and offer that person targeted services and prices, although the offline identity isn't revealed. 4 Of course, as noted earlier, given enough complementary information, traffic and trails analysis could let a determined adversary break pseudonymous and anonymous shields and reidentify the buyer's ac tual identity. A realistic goal of such protective tech nologies is simply to ensure that such attacks aren't cost effective.
Separating offline and online identities offers addi tional advantages-for example, it hides financial in formation about the consumer from the seller (as well as third parties); hence, it can help the consumer (as well as, possibly, the merchant) avoid additional (and possibly even significant) financial fraud and identity theft costs. It also protects against or decreases the risk of nonmonetary forms of discrimination or the creation of an individual's digital dossier, shared with third parties over which the consumer has no control. In spite of these protections, consumers still receive targeted or customized offers and differential prices. However, for merchants, the risk is that consumers will engage in economic arbitrage subtracting rev enues from them-particularly if pseudonymous ac counts are cheap to create.
Second, a form of behavioralbased firstdegree price discrimination can also be compatible with anonymizing technologies, as long as the individual reveals certain information: the online merchant ob serves the (anonymous, rather than pseudonymous) individual who arrives at the site after a certain search query, browses through different pages on the site, and spends time looking at particular products. Similarly to how brickandmortar sellers might try to asses the consumer's willingness to pay for a commodity in facetoface transactions, based on traits or informa tion other than that consumer's name or social secu rity number, an online merchant might, under certain conditions, estimate an anonymous visitor's willing ness to pay for a certain item, and, accordingly, set prices dynamically.
There's obviously a third, intermediate, case in which a consumer can adopt an anonymous payment technology (which in theory makes transactions both untraceable to the originating public, permanent identity, as well as unlinkable to other transactions by the same consumer); however, the consumer actu ally renders that payment pseudonymous (by design or oversight) by providing information that lets the seller track his or her transactions. For instance, the use of persistent email addresses or PO boxes, online accounts, or cookies in combination with anonymiz ing technologies might shield the buyer's public iden tity (for instance, her actual name), while allowing repeated interactions with the seller.
Second degree
Seconddegree price discrimination consists of custom ers voluntarily choosing differential prices for different versions or quantities of a good or service. This form of pricing therefore isn't based on personal information and doesn't rely on individual recognition. Neither linkability nor traceability across different transactions or identities needs to be exploited for this form of price discrimination to be enforced. In other words, a mer chant can implement seconddegree price discrimina tion even when customers adopt pseudonymous and anonymous payments strategies that shield personal information (including online information, such as email accounts or IP addresses). Price discrimination of this form is compatible with anonymous transac tions-although, as mentioned earlier, the consumer's actions could provide ulterior information adversaries could use for reidentification.
Third degree
In thirddegree price discrimination, merchants assign differential prices to different consumer segments based on some observable group characteristics. The combi nation of privacy technologies and prices targeted to customer segments is discussed by other researchers, such as Partha Das Chowdhury, 17 who suggested the use of ring signature protocols for anonymous purchas es. However, even the combination of existing anony mous payments protocols and anonymous credentials (which can prove the ownership of certain group at tributes, such as age, employment status, and so on 8 ) meets the requirements of this form of price discrimi nation. The anonymous payment protocol makes the transaction untraceable to the consumer's permanent and public identity, while the anonymous credentials allow her and the merchant to converge on a price for a particular segment of the consumer population.
I
f both merchants and consumers adopted them, identity management systems could help them finetune personal information revelation to strike a balance between consumers' privacy protection and merchants' price discrimination. In this article, I didn't aim to establish which exact proportion of price discrimination and privacy protection may be optimal or simply desirable for society, or whether price discrimination might or might not be inherently privacy intrusive. I pointed out that many such pro portions may be possible thanks to technology, with different types of privacypreserving identity manage ment strategies being compatible with various forms of differential pricing. The ensuing combination of price discrimination and privacy protection could be a desirable middle path whenever unlinkable transac tions would end up decreasing social welfare, or when traceable transactions would expose consumers to po tential costs by revealing their identities.
Customer reaction to price discrimination isn't always adversarial: Sarah Spiekermann 22 reports on survey results that confirm how consumer reactions to price discrimination depend on what degree of discrimination is imposed on them (the first degree being the least liked, and the second being the most accepted). For consumers, the advantages of adopting privacy technologies that allow for some level of in dividual tracking lie in the combination of sensitive information protection and the ability to receive per sonalized and targeted services (as well as, for some consumers, lower prices than other purchasers). For highvalue customers, the disadvantages lie in adverse price discrimination.
For merchants, combining privacyenhancing technologies and price discrimination strategies via identity management systems lets them attract and satisfy the needs of privacysensitive consumers with out harming their ability to implement pricing and marketing strategies. With identity management sys tems, technologists have given us tools that let some information be shared while other data is protected; proper use of those tools can meet both merchants' and consumers' needs. 
